Union for the Mediterranean
A media circus was in high gear as U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama was greeted in the Middle East and Europe as a political superstar in late July 2008. But a potentially far more important development in that part of the world the week before garnered little attention.
On July 13, leaders of 43 countries surrounding the Mediterranean (from Europe, North Africa and the Middle East) joined together in Paris, France, to launch a new regional union—the Mediterranean Union or, as it’s now officially called, the Union for the Mediterranean. “It brought together around one table for the first time dignitaries of such rival nations as Israel and Syria, Algeria and Morocco, Turkey and Greece ” (Associated Press, July 13, 2008).
This was a dream come true for French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who championed the creation of the bloc upon assuming office just a little over a year before. Sarkozy chaired the meeting jointly with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—the two serving as interim copresidents, as the union is to operate under a copresidency of north and south.
This is a stunning development, not only for the speed of the union’s formation—coming just over a year after it was proposed—but for its plausible ties to end-time events foretold in the Bible.
The union goes beyond the stalled 1995 Barcelona Process (named after Barcelona, Spain, where the conference was held), in which the European Union (EU) and many of its neighbors to the south and southeast formed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to promote regional stability and prosperity.
That partnership failed to achieve much of anything due to political apathy and lack of agreement on major issues.
Sarkozy proposed his union with grander aims—as “a means to end all hatreds, to make way for a great dream of peace and a great dream of civilization” (quoted in International Herald Tribune, July 6, 2008). And he initially limited it to nations bordering the Mediterranean. This, in his opinion, would have given it a greater chance of success than the Barcelona Process—there being fewer parties who would have to agree on issues and more in common regionally among the partners.
The union was also meant as a way to shore up relations with Turkey, an important bridge state between Europe and the Muslim states of North Africa and the Middle East. Sarkozy had fiercely opposed Turkish membership in the EU, so this was offered as a consolation. Turkey, however, was late in coming to the party—not agreeing to the Mediterranean Union until it had assurances that this would not hamper its efforts to join the EU.
No doubt the proposed union was also meant to elevate France’s status in the EU and in the world. It would revive France’s old colonial ties to North Africa and the Middle East. And the absence of Germany and other EU states not bordering the Mediterranean would have put France in the driver’s seat.